Immigrant Enfranchisement and Integration: Evidence from Italy

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November 16, 2022

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Abstract

We study the consequences of immigrant enfranchisement by exploiting Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007, which granted municipal election voting rights to Romanian immigrants in Italy. We conduct an event-study analysis at the municipality-by-year level and reach three key findings. First, we find that the enfranchisement of Romanian immigrants leads to an increase in the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor in municipal elections, with higher increases for municipalities expecting a competitive election. Using an instrumented difference-in-differences approach, we find the increase in representation is driven by enfranchisement of the preexisting population and not by new Romanian arrivals following the accession. Second, we find that social capital among Romanian immigrants increases after 2007, indicating that the effect of enfranchisement extends beyond political representation to integration. However, despite the increase in representation and social capital, we find that immigrant presence increases the likelihood of a right-leaning party victory, raises municipal spending on public security, and lowers spending on social programs. This suggests that natives’ backlash against immigrant presence plays a bigger role in determining the winning party than the existence of a newly enfranchised immigrant community.

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Acknowledgement: We are grateful to Pedro Dal Bó, Brian Knight, and Stelios Michalopoulos for research guidance and discussions. We would also like to thank Peter Hull, Andrew Foster, and the seminar participants at Brown University. All mistakes are our own.
1 Introduction

Understanding the integration process of immigrants is critical for not only countries that are considered traditional destinations for immigrants but also those experiencing a growing rate of immigration or a decline in fertility. While immigration could be a solution to labor shortages (Foged et al. 2022), it could also provoke a political backlash from natives (Barone et al. 2016, Becker and Fetzer 2017, Halla et. al 2017, Viskanic 2017, Barrera et al. 2020, Tabellini 2020, Koukal et al. 2021, and Mayda et al. 2022). Immigrants have been enfranchised in various countries to facilitate their integration, but whether such moves are effective remains unclear.

In this paper, we study the effect of extending voting rights to immigrants in local elections on political representation, immigrants’ social capital, ideology of the winning party, and local public finance. Exploiting Romania’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007, we focus on the enfranchisement of Romanian immigrants, the largest immigrant community in Italy. When Romania joined the EU, Romanian citizens acquired voting rights in municipal elections in Italy. As citizens of the EU are the only noncitizen residents of Italy who are allowed to vote in its municipal and EU elections, we conduct an event-study analysis around 2007 to study the effect of Romanian immigrant enfranchisement in Italy. To ensure our findings are not simply detecting a trend in municipalities populated by immigrants in general, we conduct placebo analyses for Albanian and Moroccan immigrants, who do not have voting rights but make up the second and third largest immigrant communities in Italy.

We first look at political representation, the most direct outcome of enfranchisement. The enfranchisement of Romanian immigrants increases the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities that have a higher share of Romanians. Moreover, using triple differences, we find that municipalities that were expecting a competitive election are more likely to elect a Romanian-born councilor, which suggests that political parties

\footnote{On the effect of immigrant enfranchisement on outcomes other than integration, see Bhatiya (2021), Razin and Sadka (2017), Engdahl et al. (2018), and Ferwerda (2021).}
are incentivized to include minority candidates on the expectation of a competitive election to gain votes from their newly enfranchised constituents. Since the event-study analysis only gives us the reduced-form estimates for the effect of Romania’s accession to the EU, it is not able to disentangle whether the effect we find is driven by the enfranchisement of the preexisting Romanian population or by the Romanian immigrants that arrived in large numbers after 2007. To address this issue, we instrument for the share of newly arrived Romanians and find that the effects are driven by Romanians who had migrated to Italy prior to the accession. We construct the instrument as a combination of the cross-sectoral demand for foreign labor in Italy and the outflow of Romanians to non-Italian destinations.

Next, we investigate if the effect of enfranchisement extends beyond being able to vote. We study whether social capital, proxied by consent to organ donation, increases among Romanian immigrants after the accession. Since enfranchisement invites immigrants to actively participate in local politics and opens doors for integration, we hypothesize it would affect the enfranchised individuals’ commitment to their locality. Indeed, we observe an increase after 2007 in the number of immigrants from Romania who register as potential organ donors in the given municipality, even after controlling for the number of Romanian immigrants. We do not see such an increase for the Albanians or Moroccans in Italy, suggesting that the increase observed for Romanians is caused by enfranchisement.

Since enfranchisement changes the composition of constituents, we study whether the political orientation of the winning party in municipal elections changes to reflect political preferences of those who were granted voting rights. In particular, right-leaning parties in Italy have either run anti-immigrant platforms themselves or been in a coalition with those that would during our observation period. However, we find an overall trend of increase of support for right-wing parties in municipalities with more immigrants. In both municipalities with more Romanians and municipalities with other immigrant groups, such as Albanians and Moroccans, we see a higher likelihood of right-leaning parties winning. That is, the winning party is more likely to be correlated with the presence of any immigrant community
than the presence of an immigrant community with voting rights.

Finally, since local public finance is managed by the municipal government, we examine whether local expenditure patterns change with Romanian immigrant enfranchisement. Thus, we are interested in whether expenditure shares increase in categories that are more likely to benefit Romanian immigrants to capture the attention of the new constituents. However, we find that municipalities with a greater immigrant presence see an increase in spending on public security and a decrease in social spending as shares of total expenditure. Since there is no statistical difference between municipalities with franchised immigrants (Romanians) and those with immigrants without voting rights (Albanian or Moroccan), we believe the increase in the likelihood of a right-leaning party winning in municipal elections is driven by the natives’ reaction to the presence of immigrants.

Overall, our results show positive benefits for immigrant enfranchisement in increased immigrant political representation and social capital. However, enfranchisement is not enough to stem electoral backlash against immigrants.

Our paper contributes to two literatures. First, it contributes to the literature on immigrant integration and immigrants’ legal rights in their destination country. Legalization of previously illegal immigrants leads to an improvement in their labor market outcomes (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002, Lozano and Sorensen 2011, Pan 2012, and Steigleder and Sparber 2017), a reduction in crime among them (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti 2015 and Pinotti 2017), an increase in tax filing and return (Cascio and Lewis 2019) and an increase in state transfers to regions populated by them (Sabet and Winter 2019). Moreover, some studies document that naturalization improves social integration (Hainmueller et al. 2017) and labor market outcomes (Gathmann and Keller 2017), while the timing of naturalization does not affect political integration (Engdahl et al. 2018). However, few works have studied the effect of enfranchisement. Razin and Sadka (2017) propose a model that suggests possible redistribution outcomes depending on migrants’ skill level and franchise status, and Ferwerda

Barone et al. (2016) find an increase in votes for the center-right coalition in both national and mayoral elections in Italy due to immigration.
(2021) shows that redistribution changes with immigrants’ voting rights. Bhatiya (2022), using text analysis of political discourse, detects that politicians cater to immigrants’ needs.

We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we show that enfranchisement has immediate effects on political representation. Municipalities with more Romanian citizens are significantly more likely to elect Romanian-born councilors. Second, we find enfranchisement promotes integration and altruistic behavior among the newly enfranchised as seen by the increase in consent to organ donation. Finally, we uncover the mechanisms through which immigrants gain more representation. More specifically, we show that the expectation of a competitive election increases the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor. We also show that the increase in political representation is driven by the new influx of enfranchised Romanians after 2007, suggesting that the drastic increase in the number of minority constituents plays an integral role in the increase in their representation.


The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a detailed description of our research setting. In Section 3, we describe the data used in our analyses. The empirical strategy is laid out in Section 4, and the results follow in Section 5. Section 6 presents the robustness checks. Finally, we share our concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Setting

Italy is an ideal setting to study immigrant enfranchisement and integration for three reasons. First, it has many foreign residents. In 2020, there were over five million foreign citizens, which constituted 10.4 percent of the total population in 2019 (OECD 2022). Moreover, as Italy is a member state of the EU, foreign nationals can participate in local elections as long as they are EU citizens. Finally, there are around eight thousand municipalities in Italy, which allows for fine-grained-data and large variations.

Since 1990, Italy has constantly experienced net in-migration flows, with migrants coming mainly from Romania, Albania and Morocco. Italy, together with Spain, is the main destination country for Romanian migrants, hosting 300,000 of them in 2005 and almost 1.2 million in 2017 (Figure 1). As can be seen in Figure 2, migrants of all origins tend to concentrate in the northern and central parts of the country, where the majority of manufacturing jobs are located. The regions with the most migrants are the four main northern regions (Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, and Veneto) and the central regions of Tuscany and Lazio. Romanians in particular mostly concentrate in Lazio, Lombardy, and Piedmont. Although the general region of residence is similar for different migrant communities, we still see variation in the specific municipality that has more Romanian migrants compared to the other groups as illustrated in Figure 3.

2.1 Municipal Governments in Italy

Non-Italian EU citizens who are residents of Italy are able to vote in municipal elections. Municipalities constitute the lowest tier of government across all of Italy. The size of a municipality ranges from a few hundred inhabitants to approximately 2.5 million, though the latter (Rome) is an outlier. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the municipality population. The median municipality has 2,293 residents. Even at the ninetieth percentile, the municipal population is just 12,212. This shows that the municipality-level analysis is granular.

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3Source: Istituto Cattaneo
Each municipality functions as a local government and are run by a mayor and a municipal council. The size of the latter increases discontinuously with the municipal population. It ranges from a minimum and median of twelve councilors, or ten after 2011, to a maximum of sixty, or forty-eight after 2011. The mayor is directly elected by the municipal population. The candidate whose party or supporting coalition receives most votes becomes the mayor. The constituents also vote for their most preferred councilor candidate, and the candidates that receive most votes constitute the municipal council.\footnote{Municipal elections in Italy have high turnout rates, which always exceeded sixty percent from 2000 to 2020, as depicted in Figure 5. Moreover, despite the decline in overall turnout over time, in most years the municipal turnout rate is comparable to the turnout for the general election.} Municipal elections in Italy have high turnout rates, which always exceeded sixty percent from 2000 to 2020, as depicted in Figure 5. Moreover, despite the decline in overall turnout over time, in most years the municipal turnout rate is comparable to the turnout for the general election.

### 2.2 Romanians’ Voting Rights

The EU’s Council Directive requires every member state to extend the right to vote—and to run as candidates in municipal elections—to citizens of the EU residing in a member state of which they are not nationals.\footnote{Council Directive 94/80/EC of 1994 (EU)} Italy adopted the directive in 1996 and issued a law to allow non-Italian EU citizens access to electoral contests at the municipality level.\footnote{Law 1996, n.197} The law granted the full right to vote in municipal elections to non-Italian EU citizens, with the sole condition that those citizens register for a special list of non-Italian potential voters who are residents in the municipality. Registration is only required for non-Italians who are voting for the first time. The law also regulates the right of non-Italian EU citizens to run as candidates. Upon providing documentation from the country of origin that proves the individual indeed possesses the right to be elected in their origin country, they are allowed to run for any municipal office with the exception of mayor or vice-mayor.

\footnote{When expressing their preference, voters can typically find some information about the councilor candidate on the ballot, including age and place of birth. See Figure 21 in the Appendix for example.}
2.3 Romania’s Accession to the EU

Because of the enlargement of the EU, the set of nationalities covered by the aforementioned laws is not fixed over time. When the enfranchisement laws were first introduced, the EU was mainly composed of western European countries. Thus, only western Europeans residing in Italy were initially granted the right to vote for Italian municipal governments. However, as new countries were admitted into the EU, different immigrant groups were granted the right to vote and the right to candidacy. The first wave of expansion of the EU was in 2004 when a large pool of mostly eastern European countries became member states. The second was in 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. The latter expansion was particularly consequential for Italy as it enfranchised a large part of its migrant population.

Joining the EU also meant easier access to the Italian labor market for Romanians. However, complete access to the labor market did not happen with the accession in 2007, but rolled out gradually over time because the old EU member states were allowed to place restriction on the labor market access during the transitional period. Italy did not fully lift these restrictions for Romanians until January 1, 2012. An exception was made for employees in some sectors, such as agriculture, hotels, construction, and domestic work, as well as highly qualified workers who did not need a work permit. The rest of the sectors continued to require a work permit until January 1, 2012.

We use a survey conducted by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) on Romanian Migrants in Italy before and after Romania’s accession to the EU to understand the difference in demographic and economic characteristics between Romanians who had migrated to Italy prior to the accession and those who arrived after. The survey interviewed a thousand individuals in 2011. We use national weights provided by the survey to obtain nationally representative statistics. Table displays statistics on age, marital status, existence of dependent children, education, income, and voter registration status for

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7 These include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta
those arrived during 2004-2006 and 2007-2011 respectively. Newly arrived Romanians are
significantly more likely to be younger, single, and less educated. Moreover, they are less
likely to have any dependent children or be registered to vote.

Table 2 shows the employment share of Romanian migrants by sector. We see that the
newly arrived are 2.9 percentage points less likely to be employed in hotels and restaurants,
and 5 percentage points less likely to be employed in manufacturing. However, they are 6.14
percentage points more likely to be looking for work. Given that the only sectors where they
could be employed without a work permit are agriculture, hotels, construction, and domestic
work, those who are looking for work are likely to find jobs in these sectors.

3 Data

We combine multiple data sources to construct the dataset for our analysis. The main
dataset from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), includes the number of
foreign residents and their citizenship status for approximately eight thousand municipalities
from 2003 to 2018[8] The observations are provided at the municipality-by-year level, which
is also the level of analysis throughout this paper. The summary statistics of our variables
are provided in Table 3.

3.1 Electoral Data

We merge our main dataset with data on electoral outcomes to study various political out-
ces including political representation and political orientation of the winning party. We
use data from the ”Anagrafe degli amministratori locali” provided by the Italian Ministry
of Interior to gather information on all elected municipal representatives between 1986 and
2020. The dataset provides personal information on all municipal elected official who are in
office on the 31st of December of every year. In particular, we collect their office (councilor,

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[8] Because of municipality splits and mergers, the number of municipalities may differ from year to year.
mayor etc.), municipality of birth, level of education, and political party. For representatives born outside Italy, the country of birth is stated instead of municipality of birth. However, we do not observe their citizenship status. We augment our dataset by adding information on all municipal and regional electoral returns between 2000 and 2020, as provided by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. In particular, we gather information on the exact election date, the total number of registered voters and the turnout in municipal elections, as well as the number of votes gained by every party. Moreover, we use electoral outcomes for regional elections, namely the number of registered voters and votes cast, collected at the municipality level, and compare it to the same outcomes in simultaneous municipal elections.

3.2 Organ Donation Consent Registry

We use data provided by the Italian Organ Donors Association (AIDO) on the number, municipality of residence, and place of birth of the people giving their consent through AIDO to donate their organs after death. Although we do not observe the citizenship status of the individuals giving consent, we proxy for their country of origin using their place of birth. In Italy, approximately 10 million people have consented to organ donation; 8.5 million of them have indicated their consent during the issuance of their ID card, and the remaining 1.5 million consented through AIDO (Italian Ministry of Health). Although it is required for the natives to obtain this ID card, non-Italian EU residents simply use ID cards issued by their origin countries.

3.3 Local Public Finance

The local-public-finance data come from the Italian Public Authority Data (AIDA PA). We observe yearly municipal revenue divided by source (for example, tax type or transfer from the provincial government) and spending by municipal governments divided by type of use. We construct revenue shares and expenditure shares for categories of interest by respectively dividing the revenue and expenditure in each category by the total revenue and the total
expenditure in the given municipality to make these numbers comparable across different municipalities.

3.4 Data for the Instrument

We merge Italian sectoral employment data with the migration data from the OECD to construct our instrument. First, we combine sectoral employment data at the municipality level with national foreign-employment data by sector provided by ISTAT to estimate the share of foreign employment in each municipality. Both datasets are from the 2001 census, the last census before Romania’s accession to the EU. The sectoral data provide employment information for seventeen sectors. Next, we are interested in how many Romanians left Romania for destinations other than Italy every year. The OECD migration database provides yearly data on outflows of Romanians to OECD destinations. However, the data are not collected consistently for every destination country. The outflow variable is available for the entirety of the observation period in our IV analysis (2003-2018) for nineteen of the destination countries in the OECD dataset.

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Effect of Romania’s Accession to the EU in 2007

Per the Italian law that allows all EU citizens to vote in municipal elections, Romanian residents obtained those voting rights with Romania’s accession to the EU in January 2007. We conduct an event study around 2007 to study the effect of enfranchisement on political representation, social capital, political orientation of the winning party, and local public

\footnote{These nineteen destination countries are Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, South Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.}
finance. The following is the specification we use:

\[ Y_{mt} = \alpha + \beta Immig_{m}^{2003} + \left[ \sum_{s=1986}^{2020} \gamma_s Immig_{m}^{2003} \times 1_t\{t = s\} \right] + \eta_p + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{mt}. \]  

(1)

Here, \( Y_{mt} \) is the outcome variable for municipality \( m \) in year \( t \) and \( Immig_{m}^{2003} \) is the share of immigrants from a given origin country in municipality \( m \) in 2003, the earliest year for which we have the count of immigrants from each origin country at the municipality level. We fix the share of immigrants at its 2003 level as our time-invariant measure. We argue that the 2003 share of Romanian immigrants is exogenous with respect to the event because the official conclusion of accession negotiations with Romania was confirmed by the European Council on December 17, 2004, although Romania had submitted its official application to join in 1995. Our alternative specification includes municipality fixed effects instead of \( Immig_{m}^{2003} \). Finally, \( \eta_p \) represents province fixed effects and \( \theta_t \) denotes year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to account for the correlations in the error term among observations in the same municipality.

We run specification (1) for Romanians as our main result, but we also run the specification for Albanians and Moroccans, the largest immigrant groups after Romanians throughout the observation period, for comparison. This placebo analysis is intended to discern whether the changes we observe are due to a trend among immigrants in general or enfranchisement of Romanians. As the Albanian and Moroccan immigrants do not have voting rights in Italy we use them as our comparison group to separate out the general trend among immigrants.

Although immigrants from other EU states could also constitute a helpful comparison group in theory since they have had the right to vote since 1996, it is difficult to compare our findings on Romanians with immigrants from other EU states for two reasons. First, in most of our analyses, we proxy for the number of immigrants using information on a resident’s place of birth, not nationality. However, many residents born in wealthier western EU states, such as Germany or France, have Italian names, indicating they are likely to be
Italians born abroad, not immigrants. This makes it difficult to conduct an analysis for the population that is relevant to our research since the foreign-born Italians have always had voting rights because they are Italian citizens. Second, the number of those who are born in Germany or France, which are the two most prominent places of birth among EU countries after Romania, is far lower than the number born in Romania. By contrast, the number of people born in Albania and the number born in Morocco are more comparable with the size of the Romanian-born population.

4.2 Effect of Enfranchisement vs. New Arrivals

The event-study specification boils down to a difference-in-differences specification in which we compare the pre- and post-2007 outcomes for municipalities that had many Romanian residents with those that did not in 2003. While the event guarantees that Romanian immigrants who are not Italian citizens could only vote after 2007, it does not allow us to distinguish between effects arising from the preexisting Romanian population that was granted voting rights in 2007 and those arising from the influx of Romanians who entered Italy with voting rights after 2007. To identify the driving force of the effect of enfranchisement, we employ the following instrumented difference-in-differences specification:

\[
Y_{mt} = \beta_0 + \beta^E Early_{mt} + \beta_1 Post2007_t + \gamma^E Early_{mt} \times Post2007_t \\
+ \gamma^N New_{mt} + \eta_m + \theta_t + \nu_{mt}. \tag{2}
\]

Here, \( Early_{mt} \) denotes the share of preexisting Romanians and \( New_{mt} \) the share of Romanians that arrived after the accession. As an exogenous proxy for \( Early_{mt} \) we use the share of Romanian immigrants in municipality \( m \) in 2003.

The new arrivals after 2007, or \( New_{mt} \), present an endogeneity problem. Namely, Romanian immigrants may have selectively migrated to municipalities with a preexisting Romanian population for reasons correlated with the outcome variable, which is an indicator variable stating whether a given municipality has at least one Romanian-born councilor in
a given year. To address this issue, we find an instrument for the share of Romanian immigrants that captures the new arrivals of Romanian immigrants in a given municipality but is uncorrelated with the outcome variables otherwise.

### 4.2.1 Identification Assumptions

We instrument for $New_{mt}$, the share of Romanians who arrived after 2007 in municipality $m$ in year $t$ with the following expression:

$$Z_{mt} = \left( \sum_{\text{sector}} \text{EmpShare}_m^{2001} \times \text{ForeignEmp}_m^{2001} \right) \times \text{Outflow}_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Here, $\text{EmpShare}_m^{2001}$ is the employment share of a given sector in municipality $m$ in 2001 and $\text{ForeignEmp}_m^{2001}$ is the number of foreign workers employed in sector in year 2000 as a fraction of total workers in the sector nationwide. Our data provide the municipal level employment share for seventeen sectors in 2001. The total outflow of Romanian migrants to destinations other than Italy from 2007 to year $t$ is denoted by $\text{Outflow}_t$. The idea is to first weight the sectoral employment share in each municipality by how likely each sector’s job openings are to be filled by foreign workers. Then, this figure is multiplied by the yearly outflow of Romanians to estimate the amount of foreign employment that is likely to be taken up by Romanians.

The key idea is that in each municipality, there is demand for labor in certain sectors that is more likely to be satisfied by foreign workers than natives. If foreign labor of one origin country works as a substitute for the labor of another, Romanians fill these posts proportionately where the proportion is approximated by the outflow of Romanians to various destinations other than Italy. However, we only include sectors for which Romanians could work for without a work permit during the adjustment period 2007-2011. This is to discount sectors such as manufacturing or wholesale and retail trade that are large employers of foreign residents, but are irrelevant to new arrivals after Romania’s accession. Indeed, Romanians
who arrived after the accession were much more likely to be employed in the sectors that had work permit exemption for Romanians.\footnote{The included sectors are Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry; Fishing, Pisciculture, and Related Services; Construction; Hotels and Restaurants; Financial Intermediaries; Real Estate, Informatics, Research, Other Professional and Entrepreneurial Activities; Public Administration and Defense; Education; Healthcare and Other Social Services; Domestic Services for Families; and International Organization. Those omitted are Mining and Quarrying; Manufacturing; Energy Utilities; Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Household Goods; Transportation and Distribution; and Other Public Social Services.}

We make the following assumptions for identification. First, the sectoral employment in 2001 is predetermined and exogenous. It cannot be affected by the Romanian inflow, which mainly happens years after 2001. Moreover, we do not see a reason to suspect having a greater share of industries that are more likely to hire foreign employees will affect the likelihood of electing a Romanian councilor in any other way than through the change in Romanian share in the given municipality. Second, the outflow of Romanians in a given year to a destination other than Italy is determined by the conditions in Romania, such as the country’s economic or political circumstances, and not by conditions in Italy. A remaining threat to identification is that the sectoral composition of a labor market could determine other political outcomes. However, we only employ this IV approach when our dependent variable is whether the given municipality has Romanian-born councilor. We believe the sectoral employment can only affect this specific outcome through determining the share of Romanians in the municipality. Thus, the exclusion restriction is not violated.

5 Findings

5.1 Romanian Political Representation

5.1.1 Romanian-Born Councilors

Figure 6 presents the event-study result of specification (1) on whether the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor increased after Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007, controlling for the time-invariant share of Romanians in each municipality at its 2003 level. Our
outcome variable is a binary variable indicating whether the municipality has a Romanian-born councilor, instead of a continuous variable indicating the total number of Romanian-born councilors, because it is very rare for a municipality to have more than one. We see an insignificant and flat pre-trend before 2007. We display the 1986-2002 period despite fixing the immigrant share at the 2003 level to show that migrants did not select into municipalities that already had Romanian councilors. The point estimate for the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities with a larger time-invariant share of Romanians starts increasing in 2009. The increase begins in 2009 and not 2008 because the cycle for municipal elections is asynchronous. Figure 7 shows that only a few elections occurred in 2008 and the majority of municipalities had elections in 2009. Figure 8 presents an alternative specification with municipality fixed effects, and our finding does not change. In Figure 9 we confirm that collapsing our observations to the electoral cycle level does not change our result. In addition, we show that our finding holds even after controlling for the presence of other large immigrant groups. We extend specification (1) to include the fixed share of Albanians and Moroccans as well as these fixed shares interacted with year dummies. We plot the result in Figure 10 and confirm that the increase in likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor persists.

We perform placebo analyses on the two comparison communities, Albanians and Moroccans. To prevent potential confounding effects from the presence of these other large immigrant communities, we control for the fixed shares of the remaining two immigrant groups and these shares interacted with the year dummies. The results are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. We do not observe an increase around the time of Romania’s accession in the likelihood of having an Albanian-born councilor in Figure 11 or a Moroccan-born councilor in Figure 12. We conclude that no event around 2007 other than Romania’s accession increased the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor. That is, we rule out the possibility that the effect we see is due to a confounding event that occurred in 2007 and increased in the likelihood of a foreign-born councilor.
We have two theories for why we observe statistically significant coefficients for 2019 and 2020 in our placebo analyses. One is that voters in municipalities with more immigrants became more open to the idea of having a foreign-born councilor because of persistent exposure. The other is that over time, Albanian and Moroccan immigrants gained citizenships and started to support candidates who were born in the same country as themselves, who now have the right to candidacy through naturalization. Figure 13 shows the annual naturalization counts (in thousands) of those whose origin country is Romania, Albania, or Morocco. We can see that the naturalization counts are much larger for Albanians and Moroccans than Romanians likely because of the timing of immigration. Albanians and Moroccans started to immigrate to Italy in large numbers before the Romanians. For instance, many Albanians immigrated following the fall of the Albanian communist regime. Because naturalization requires the applicant to have lived in Italy for at least ten years in most cases, it is not until much after the start of a large influx that we observe an increase in naturalization in the associated community.

In addition to the event-study analysis, we pool the years into two periods—pre- and post-2007—to get an estimate of the enfranchisement effect on political representation. The results are presented in Table 4. The dependent variable in the first three columns is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in a given year. The independent variable in the next three columns is equal to 1 if a given municipality has an Albanian-born councilor in a given year, and the last three columns a Moroccan councilor. Columns (1), (4), and (7) include province and year fixed effects, columns (2), (5), and (8) instead control for province-by-year fixed effects, and columns (3), (6), and (9) include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by municipality.

We find a significant increase in the likelihoods of having Romanian-born councilor after 2007 as well as that for Albanian-born and Moroccan-born councilors. However, the magnitude of the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor is double that of an Albanian-
born councilor and almost five times that of a Moroccan-born councilor. Our independent variable of interest is the immigrant share of a given community interacted with the post-2007 indicator variable. A municipality with 1 more percentage point in the Romanian share in 2003 increases its likelihood of electing a Romanian councilor by 0.497 percentage point; having 1 more percentage point in the Albanian or Moroccan share in 2003 increases the likelihood of electing an Albanian-born or Moroccan-born councilor by 0.237 and 0.096 percentage points, respectively. Thus, although the estimate is significant for all three immigrant communities, the magnitude of the estimate is greatest for the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities with a high share of Romanians. If the positive coefficient estimates for \((\text{Albanian share in 2003} \times \text{Post2007})\) and \((\text{Moroccan share in 2003} \times \text{Post2007})\) are indeed due to naturalization of Albanian and Moroccan immigrants in Italy who arrived earlier than the Romanian immigrants, we expect to detect an effect on their political representation since they too have been enfranchised.

5.1.2 Competitive Elections

In this subsection, we study the mechanism behind the increase in the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor. First, we examine whether the likelihood increases in a competitive election setting. Elections can be competitive as a result of a shift in the composition of candidates. For instance, including a minority candidate could mobilize both the minority constituents in support and natives who turn out to prevent the candidate from being elected. Thus, we look at whether municipalities that were expecting a competitive election are more likely to have a Romanian-born councilor. The following specification is intended
to answer this question:

\[ Rep_{mc} = a_0 + a_1 \text{Competitive}_{mc} + \sum_{s=3,4,5} \left[ b_s \text{Cycle}_s \times \text{Competitive}_{mc} \right] + \sum_{o \in O} \left\{ c_o \text{Share}^{o,2003}_s \times \text{Competitive}_{mc} + \sum_{s=3,4,5} \left[ d_s \text{Share}^o \times \text{Cycle}_s \right] \right\} \]

\[ + \sum_{s=3,4,5} \left[ e_s \text{Share}^{o,2003}_s \times \text{Cycle}_s \times \text{Competitive}_{mc} \right] \]

\[ + \eta_m + \theta_c + \tilde{\epsilon}_{mc}. \]  

Here, \( Rep_{mc} \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if municipality \( m \) in electoral cycle \( c \) has a councilor born in a given origin country. Considering Romania’s accession in 2007 and the 5-year electoral cycle in municipal elections, we define the cycles around 2007 to include 5 years of observation. The variable \( \text{Competitive}_{mc} \) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if municipality \( m \) had a competitive election in cycle \( c - 1 \). We define a competitive election as an election in which the difference in the vote shares of the party that received the most votes and the one that came in second is less than 5 percentage points. The origin countries considered in this specification are again \( O = \{ \text{Romania, Albania, Morocco} \} \). We include municipality and cycle fixed effects, which are denoted respectively as \( \eta_m \) and \( \theta_c \).

We hypothesize that if political parties anticipate a tight election, they are more likely to include minority candidates in their list of councilor candidates to gain votes from minority constituents, especially in municipalities where minority communities are large. The coefficient \( e_s \) for the triple interaction term \( \text{Share}^{o,2003}_s \times \text{Cycle}_s \times \text{Competitive}_{mc} \) for each cycle is shown in Figure 14. We see a significant increase in the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities that were expecting competitive elections in electoral cycles 2013-2017 and 2018-2020 as the share of Romanians in the given municipality increases. The coefficient is not significant in the 2008-2012 electoral cycle, which was the first cycle after Romanians gained the rights to vote and candidacy. This could be because it takes time for parties to learn about the effectiveness of having a Romanian-born candidate on their slate.
We do not find any effect in our placebo specifications in which the dependent variable is the likelihood of having an Albanian-born or Moroccan-born councilor. Table 6 shows coefficient estimates of a selection of independent variables are also shown. The double interaction between Romanian share in 2003 and indicator variables for cycles show that Romanian share has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor, yet the triple interaction terms exhibit a positive and significant effect in addition to the former effect.

To ensure that it was plausible for parties to consider including a minority candidate, we analyze whether the newly enfranchised Romanians registered to vote. Although voter registration is not required for Italian citizens to vote, it is required for residents with citizenship from another EU member state voting for the first time. Unfortunately, we do not observe the number of Romanians who are registered to vote in each municipality until 2011. To circumvent this issue, we exploit the fact that only Italian citizens can vote in the regional elections and focus on the dates on which the regional elections took place simultaneously with municipal elections. We run the following regression:

\[
D_{\text{Voters}_{mt}} = b_0 + b_1 \text{Immig}_{m}^{2003} + \left[ \sum_s b_s \text{Immig}_{m}^{2003} \times 1_{t=s} \right] + \eta_p + \theta_t + e_{mt}. \tag{5}
\]

The dependent variable \( D_{\text{Voters}_{mt}} \) is the difference in the level of registered voters as a percentage of the municipality population between municipal and regional elections. We divide the level difference by the population because more populous municipalities will mechanically show a greater difference otherwise. The years we observe the municipality election taking place on the same day as the regional election for some municipalities are 2000, 2005, 2010, 2014, 2015, 2019, and 2020.\(^{12}\) We normalize the estimate for 2005 to be zero. Province and year fixed effects are included.

The coefficients \( b_s \) and their corresponding confidence intervals at the 95 percent are

\(^{12}\) The exact dates are April 26, 2000; April 3, 2005; March 28, 2010, November 17, 2013; May 25, 2014; May 31, 2015; May 26, 2019; and September 20, 2020. We dropped the two municipalities whose municipal and regional elections were simultaneously held on November 17, 2013, because of the small number.
plotted in Figure 15. We observe a significant and large difference between the number of voters registered for municipal elections and that for regional elections as a share of the municipal population in 2010 and 2014 in municipalities with a higher share of Romanians. The estimates for the placebo groups, Albanians and Moroccans, are close to zero and insignificant. In later years—2015, 2019, and 2020—the significance dissipates, but the point estimate is still positive and greater than that for the placebo groups. If the gap in the number of registered voters between municipal and regional elections in municipalities with more Romanians arises because Romanian residents registered to vote in municipal elections, then the number of constituents in municipal elections must have increased. This would be consistent with the conjecture that political parties consider running Romanian candidates to earn the votes of registered Romanian voters. Figure 16 also plots coefficients $b_s$ except the dependent variable is now the difference between the number of actual voters in municipal elections and that in regional elections. If more Romanians show up in municipal elections, the estimates should be significant and positive. However, we only find the estimate for the 2010 election to be positive. Although most of the estimates for the remaining years in the post-2007 period also have positive point estimates, they are not significant.

We now analyze the partisan affiliation of the elected Romanian-born candidates. The political orientation of the Romanian-born councilors is illustrated in Table 5. We do not see a statistical difference between Romanian-born and non-Romanian-born councilors in terms of which type ideology they belong to. However, we do see that the Romanian-born councilors are significantly more likely to belong to the winning party than the non-Romanian councilors. We then split the sample of councilors into pre- and post-2014 elections. We find that Romanian councilors were significantly less likely to belong to the winning party before 2014. This indicates that in the first cycle of municipal elections after the enfranchisement in which Romanian-born candidates were elected (2009-2013), those who were elected belonged to the opposition. Over time, either they got included in the parties with more support from the municipal population or having a Romanian candidate led the parties to win.
5.1.3 Enfranchisement of the Preexisting Immigrant Population vs. Arrivals of Newly Enfranchised Immigrants

Using the IV approach and instrumenting for $New_{mt}$ in equation (2) with the expression in equation (3), we disentangle whether the increase in the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor is driven by the enfranchisement of the preexisting population or by the arrivals of newly enfranchised Romanians. The first stage results are presented in Table 7. The instrument strongly predicts the share of new Romanians at the municipality-by-year level, thus satisfying the relevance condition. In column (1), we use Romanian share at the 2003 level for $Early_{mt}$, whereas in column (2), we let $Early_{mt}$ equal to the current Romanian share in year $t$ up to 2007 and fix the share at the 2007 share from 2008 onward to see whether fixing the share of early Romanians in 2003 was driving the result. In both specifications, the instrument relevance is strong. The coefficient for $New_{mt}$ is positive and statistically significant. Further, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic ranges from 42.70 to 47.74 and shows that we do not suffer from a weak instrument problem.

Table 8 presents a comparison of the OLS and 2SLS specifications of equation (2). The first two columns present the results from the OLS specification. Columns (3) and (4) are 2SLS results that correspond to columns (1) and (2) from the first stage specifications in Table 7. In both columns (1) and (2) the OLS estimates are significant for both the preexisting share of Romanians and the new Romanian arrivals. However, once we instrument for the inflow of new arrivals, the 2SLS estimates for new arrivals are no longer significant, and if anything, their point estimates are negative. On the other hand, the effect for the preexisting share remains significant and positive. This means the IV specification corrected a downward bias for the effect of preexisting Romanian share and a upward bias for the effect of Romanian share of new arrivals in the OLS specification. In the preferred specification in column (3), the estimate states that a municipality with 1 more percentage point of preexisting Romanian population increases its likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor by 0.472 percentage points. We conclude that the effect of enfranchisement on Romanian-born
political representation is mainly driven by the Romanians who were already living in Italy prior to the accession.

Based on the survey data on Romanian migrants in Italy from WIIW (2012) weighted for national representation, we find that 23.89% of Romanian migrants that arrived in Italy during the years 2004-2006 were registered to vote whereas only 5.36% of Romanian migrants that arrived between 2007 and 2010 had registered to vote. This comparison of rate of voter registration between preexisting and newly arrived Romanians corroborates our finding. Overall, our findings suggest that enfranchisement of preexisting Romanian population is what caused Romanian-born political representation to increase.

5.2 Social Capital

Proponents of noncitizen voting argue that extending the franchise to resident immigrants would increase civic participation and benefit the entire community, but there is not sufficient evidence to support this claim. We test whether social capital increases when immigrants are granted voting rights. Following the literature, we use data on organ-donation-consent (from AIDO) to gauge the level of social capital. The AIDO dataset contains information on those who have registered to be potential organ donors. Most importantly, it allows us to observe where the individuals are born and in which municipality they resided at the time of registration.

We slightly modify the specification from equation (1) to study the level of social capital so we can to incorporate the individual-level data we have on registering as potential organ donors. The outcome variable is the number of immigrants from a given country that registered in municipality $m$ in year $t$. Instead of controlling for a time-invariant share of

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13 The unweighted percentages of registered to vote are 23.48% and 5.32% respectively.

14 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, social capital refers to the interpersonal networks and common civic values which influence the infrastructure and economy of a particular society; the nature, extent, or value of these.

15 Putnam (1993, 2000) and Guiso et al. (2004) use blood donation and Bartscher et al. (2021) use blood and organ donation along with other measures to capture social capital.

16 $\text{DonorConsent}_{mt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 \text{ImmigCount}_{mt} + \left[ \sum_{s=2003}^{2018} \pi_s \mathbb{I}_t \{ t = s \} \right] + \eta_m + \nu_{mt}$
immigrants from a given origin country, we control for the time-variant immigrant count from the origin country to rule out the possibility that the number of donors increases mechanically simply because of an increase in the total number of Romanians after 2007. Further, we focus on whether the number of consents increased after the accession in each municipality after controlling for the number of all nationals in the municipality from the origin country of interest. That is we focus on the coefficients for the year dummies.

The event-study analysis is presented in Figure 17. We find a significant increase in the number of Romanian immigrants registering as potential organ donors despite controlling for the total number of Romanian immigrants in each municipality. Thus, the increase we observe after 2007 is not a mechanical increase following the influx of Romanians after the accession. We do not observe a significant increase in the number of immigrants from either Albania or Morocco registering as potential organ donors around 2007. Hence, we believe the increase in organ-donation consent among Romanian-born residents is specific to Romanians and not a general trend among immigrants.

5.3 Winning Party
Barone et al. (2016) find that an increase in immigrant share increased the likelihood of electing a right-wing mayor in Italian municipalities. Most right-leaning parties in Italy have maintained an anti-immigration stance at the national level during our observation period. Right-leaning parties that are not strictly considered anti-immigrant have been in coalitions with a right-wing party that had a strong anti-immigrant stance. In this subsection, we investigate whether enfranchising the largest immigrant community balances out the increase in support for a right-wing mayoral candidate documented by Barone et al. (2016). We analyze the ideology of the winning party in municipal elections around the 2007 accession. As mentioned in Section 2, the mayor, vice mayor, and councilors are chosen in municipal elections. Candidates can individually be elected as councilor, but the majority of the councilors and the mayor come from the winning party or coalition. Thus, investigating the
winning party tells us how the municipality voted in general and who gained control over the steering wheel of the municipal government.

We categorize the parties into five different types: right-leaning, centrist, left-leaning, civic, and Five Star Movement. To classify the parties into these five categories, we analyze the name of the party and confirm using the party’s Wikipedia page. We classify a party as left-leaning when (1) the term *Left (Sinistra)* appears in the name, (2) the party participates in a coalition with a party that has been traditionally categorized to be left-leaning, such as the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico), or (3) the party is categorized as left-leaning by Wikipedia. Similarly, we classify a party as right-leaning when (1) the term *Right (Destra)* appear in the name, (2) the party participates in a coalition with a party that has been traditionally categorized as right-leaning, such as Forza Italia or National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), or (3) the party is categorized as right-leaning by Wikipedia. The center parties are those that are not in a coalition with any parties that are classified as left- or right-leaning and contain the term *Center (Centro)*, such as the Union of the Center (Unione di Centro). Finally, a party is considered civic if it is not in a coalition with any party classified as left- or right-leaning and contains either the word *Civic (Civico)* or *Independent (Indipendente)*.

Figure 18 shows that the likelihood of a right-leaning party winning in municipal elections increases over time in municipalities that are home to more immigrants from any of the three largest immigrant communities—Romanian, Albanian, or Moroccan. Since the pattern is very similar across all three groups even though Romanians gain voting rights and the other two groups do not, we believe enfranchisement of Romanians in itself did not cause the ideology of the winning party to change. Instead, the presence of any immigrant community, whether it had the franchise or not, played a larger role. We observe a slight decrease in the likelihood of civic parties winning for a few years after 2007, but the likelihood returns to its previous level soon after. We do not observe any significant and consistent patterns for the other types of parties.
5.4 Local Public Finance

Research studying women’s suffrage and the U.S. Voting Rights Act have found a significant change in public finance after franchise was extended to a new subset of the population. We examine whether there are any distinct patterns in local public finance for municipalities with more Romanians after their enfranchisement. First, we look at the evolution of the property tax and waste tax as shares of total revenue for each municipality to see whether the tax burden on homeowners changes. Figure 20 shows an increase in the property tax and a decrease in the waste tax over time in municipalities with more Romanians compared to those with fewer. However, we do not see any statistical difference between municipalities with more Romanians in comparison to those with more Albanians or Moroccans. Consequently, we conclude that local tax-revenue composition is unaffected by extending voting rights to Romanian immigrants.

We then investigate the breakdown of expenditure. In Figure 20, we present an event-study analysis of the expenditure shares of five main categories of local expenditure: education, public housing, public security, social programs, and transportation. Once again, we do not observe a statistical difference between municipalities with more Romanians in comparison to those with more Albanians or Moroccans. We find that in municipalities with a large presence of at least one of the three immigrant communities, the expenditure share on public security increases over time and the expenditure share on social programs decreases. This finding is consistent with our finding of an increase in the likelihood of a right-leaning party or coalition winning the municipal election when there is a large presence of any of the three largest immigrant communities.

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18 In 2016, 20 percent of foreigners owned a house compared to 77 percent of Italians.
6 Conclusion

We studied the effect of immigrant enfranchisement on political representation, social capital, political orientation of the winning party, and local public finance. Exploiting Romania’s accession to the European Union in 2007, we found that the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor increases for municipalities with a greater share of Romanian immigrants. To better understand the mechanisms, we first looked at competitive elections. We found that municipalities that expect to have a competitive election are even more likely to have a Romanian-born councilor. We suggest that this is evidence that political parties are more likely to run a minority candidate when they anticipate a tight election. We then investigated whether the effect we found on political representation comes from the enfranchisement of the preexisting Romanian population or new arrivals of the enfranchised Romanians. Using an IV approach, we found that the latter is likely the driving force.

We found that the effect of enfranchisement of immigrants extends beyond political outcomes into the social realm. We found an increase in the amount of social capital, proxied by the rate of consent to organ donation, among Romanians after the 2007 accession of Romania to the EU. Regarding the question whether the political representation of the winning party and the local public-finance pattern in a municipality change after the enfranchisement of Romanians, we did not detect a different pattern in municipalities populated by Romanians in comparison to those populated by Albanians and Moroccans, our comparison groups. In municipalities with any of the three immigrant communities, the likelihood of a right-leaning party winning increases with the immigrant share. We also documented that in these municipalities, the expenditure share of public security increases and that of social programs decreases. We believe future work is needed to better understand how the preferences of a newly enfranchised group may differ from groups that have not yet been enfranchised and study the effect on public spending that are more specific to certain communities.
References


Voting Rights for Foreign Citizens – A Catalyst for Integration?" Working Paper


Mara, Isilda (2012). “Surveying Romanian migrants in Italy before and after the EU Accession: migration plans, labour market features and social inclusion.” Norface Migration Discussion Paper No. 2012-24


Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Number of Foreign Nationals Living in Italy by Nationality

The figure shows the evolution of the yearly number of foreign nationals living in Italy by their nationality from 2003 to 2018. (Source: ISTAT)
Figure 2: Maps of Immigrant Shares at the Municipality Level
Figure 3: Share of Romanians Among Immigrants by Municipality and Year

The maps above display the number of Romanians as a fraction of total immigrants within a given municipality in years 2003, 2007, and 2011 respectively.
Figure 4: Distribution of Municipality Population

The graph above shows the distribution of municipality population for all municipalities up to the 99th percentile by population. The median municipality has 2,293 residents. (Source: 2001 Italian Census)

Figure 5: Turnout for General vs. Municipal Elections in Italy

The graph above compares the turnout for general vs. municipal elections in Italy. (Source: Department of Interior of Italy)
Figure 6: Event Study for Political Representation with Romanian Share Fixed at its 2003 Level

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between Romanian share fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for share of Romanians at its 2003 level, as well as province and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figure 7: Municipal Election Cycle

The graph above displays the number of municipal elections that took place in each year from 1986 to 2020. Although the municipal election cycle is asynchronous, the majority of municipalities have their election during the biggest cycle.
Figure 8: Event Study for Political Representation with Romanian Share Fixed at its 2003 Level (Municipality Fixed Effect)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between Romanian share fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figure 9: Event Study for Political Representation with Romanian Share Fixed at its 2003 Level Collapsed to Electoral Cycles (Municipality Fixed Effect)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study where the years are collapsed to electoral cycles. The plotted coefficients are for the interaction terms between Romanian share fixed at its 2003 level and cycle dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figure 10: Event Study for Likelihood of Having a Romanian-Born Councilor with Fixed Immigrant Shares (Controlling for the Presence of Other Immigrant Communities)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between Romanian share and year dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figure 11: Event Study for Likelihood of Having a Albanian-Born Councilor with Fixed Immigrant Shares (Controlling for the Presence of Other Immigrant Communities)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Albanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between Albanian share and year dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figure 12: Event Study for Likelihood of Having a Moroccan-Born Councilor with Fixed Immigrant Shares (Controlling for the Presence of Other Immigrant Communities)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Moroccan-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between Moroccan share and year dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figure 13: Annual Naturalization Count in Italy by Origin Country

The graph above displays annual naturalization count in Italy for migrants from Romania, Albania, and Morocco respectively.
The graph above plots the coefficients from the triple-difference specification for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the cycle dummies. The dependent variable is stated above each graph. It is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a councilor who was born in the country stated in the given cycle. In each graph, the coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest and cycle dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively.
Figure 15: Difference Between the Number of Registered Voters in Municipal vs. Regional Elections as a Share of Municipal Population

The above graph displays the coefficients for interaction terms where the interaction is between immigrant share of interest at its 2003 level and year dummies in equation (5). The dependent variable is the difference in the level of registered voters as a percentage of the municipality population between municipal and regional elections. The red dot refers to the regression where the immigrant share of interest referred to Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest referred to Albanian and Moroccan share respectively.
Figure 16: Difference Between the Number of Actual Voters in Municipal vs. Regional Elections as a Share of Municipal Population

The above graph displays the coefficients for interaction terms where the interaction between immigrant share of interest at its 2003 level and year dummies in equation (5). The dependent variable is the difference between the number of actual voters in municipal elections and that in regional elections. The red dot refers to the regression where the immigrant share of interest referred to Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest referred to Albanian and Moroccan share respectively.
The graphs above illustrate the coefficients for year dummies in $DonorConsent_{mt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 ImmigCount_{mt} + \sum_{s=2003}^{2018} \pi_s I(t=s) + \eta_m + \nu_{mt}$ where standard errors are clustered by municipality. In three different regressions, the independent variable is the number of consents given by those who were born in Romania, Albania, and Morocco respectively in a given municipality and year. The dependent variable $ImmigCount_{mt}$ corresponds to the number of residents in a given municipality and year who are nationals of Romania, Albania, and Morocco respectively in accordance with the dependent variable.
The graphs above plot the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The red dot refers to the regression in which the immigrant share or interest is Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest is Albanian and Moroccan share respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the winning party in the municipal election has a political ideology mentioned in the title of each graph and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 18: Event Study of Winning Parties/Coalitions
The graphs above plot the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The red dot refers to the regression in which the immigrant share or interest is Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest is Albanian and Moroccan share respectively. The dependent variable is the tax collection corresponding to the title of the graph as a share of municipal government revenue. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The graphs above plot the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The red dot refers to the regression in which the immigrant share or interest is Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest is Albanian and Moroccan share respectively. The dependent variable is the level of spending corresponding to the title of the graph as a share of municipal government total expenditure. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Table 1: Characteristic Comparison Between Preexisting and Newly Arrived Romanians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival in Italy:</th>
<th>2004-2006</th>
<th>2007-2010</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-24</td>
<td>0.1044</td>
<td>0.2158</td>
<td>0.1113***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>0.3746</td>
<td>0.3710</td>
<td>-0.0037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>0.3654</td>
<td>0.2885</td>
<td>-0.0768**</td>
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<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td>0.1556</td>
<td>0.1247</td>
<td>-0.0309</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.6058</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>0.1438</td>
<td>0.2761</td>
<td>0.1323***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with Partner</td>
<td>0.1266</td>
<td>0.1171</td>
<td>-0.0095</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
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<td>0.0903</td>
<td>-0.0145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
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<td>Has dependent children</td>
<td>0.5031</td>
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<td>0.0694</td>
<td>0.0342**</td>
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<td>-0.0270</td>
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<td>Registered to Vote</td>
<td>0.2389</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
<td>-0.1853***</td>
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</table>

The table displays the characteristic comparison between Romanian migrants that arrived in Italy during 2004-2006 and those that arrived during 2007-2010, which is after Romania’s accession to the EU. The statistics come from the survey on Romanian migrants in Italy before and after the EU Accession, provided by WIIW. We use the national weights given by WIIW for this table to show the nationally representative characteristics of Romanian migrants.
Table 2: Employment Share of Romanian Migrants by Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrivals in Italy:</th>
<th>2004-2006</th>
<th>2007-2010</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, and forestry</td>
<td>0.0110</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0.2019</td>
<td>0.2429</td>
<td>0.0410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic services for families</td>
<td>0.1372</td>
<td>0.1575</td>
<td>0.0204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.0053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial intermediaries</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare and other social services</td>
<td>0.0476</td>
<td>0.0424</td>
<td>-0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>0.0618</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
<td>-0.0290**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.1070</td>
<td>0.0570</td>
<td>-0.0500***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public social services</td>
<td>0.0138</td>
<td>0.0140</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and defense</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and entrepreneurial activities</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>0.0453</td>
<td>-0.0171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and distribution</td>
<td>0.0373</td>
<td>0.0472</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>0.2250</td>
<td>0.1867</td>
<td>-0.0383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying at home or looking after children</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
<td>0.0332</td>
<td>0.01352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
<td>0.0410</td>
<td>0.0137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking for work</td>
<td>0.0102</td>
<td>0.0716</td>
<td>0.0614***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0279</td>
<td>0.0141</td>
<td>-0.0138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table displays the employment share of Romanian migrants by sector divided into two groups—Romanian migrants that arrived in Italy during 2004-2006 and those that arrived during 2007-2011, which is after Romania’s accession to the EU. The statistics come from the survey on Romanian migrants in Italy before and after the EU Accession, provided by WIIW. We use the national weights given by WIIW for this table to show the nationally representative characteristics of Romanian migrants.
The table displays the summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses throughout the paper.
Table 4: Political Representation (Pooled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var: presence of councilor born in</th>
<th>(1) Romania</th>
<th>(2) Romania</th>
<th>(3) Romania</th>
<th>(4) Albania</th>
<th>(5) Albania</th>
<th>(6) Albania</th>
<th>(7) Morocco</th>
<th>(8) Morocco</th>
<th>(9) Morocco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>0.065*</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.050**</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003 × Post2007</td>
<td>0.497***</td>
<td>0.456***</td>
<td>0.558***</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003 × Post2007</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.237***</td>
<td>0.236***</td>
<td>0.242***</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003 × Post2007</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.040*</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.096***</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province × Year FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>137,916</td>
<td>137,916</td>
<td>138,120</td>
<td>137,916</td>
<td>137,916</td>
<td>138,120</td>
<td>137,916</td>
<td>137,916</td>
<td>138,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep var mean</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a given municipality has at least one councilor born in the origin country specified in the second row in a given year.
Table 5: Political Orientation of Romanian Councilors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Romanian-born</th>
<th>Romanian-born</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>sd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>790030</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>1326900</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1326900</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>1326900</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning party(year&lt;2014)</td>
<td>268089</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above reports a summary statistics of the partisan affiliation of the elected Romanian-born candidates. The last row reports statistics on the non-Romanian-born and Romanian-born councilors who were elected before 2014 and were a member of the winning party or coalition in their municipality.
Table 6: Likelihood of Electing Romanian-Born Councilor in Competitive Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep var: presence of councilor born in</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>0.932**</td>
<td>0.952***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 3</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.287*</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 4</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>1.755***</td>
<td>1.830***</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 5</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.479</td>
<td>-0.380</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 3 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.670)</td>
<td>(0.693)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>1.793***</td>
<td>1.949***</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 4 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td>(0.670)</td>
<td>(0.489)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>1.413*</td>
<td>1.786**</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 5 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.733)</td>
<td>(0.761)</td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.164*</td>
<td>0.165*</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 3</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>0.333***</td>
<td>0.349***</td>
<td>0.180*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 4</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.420***</td>
<td>1.140***</td>
<td>1.173***</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 5</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 3 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
<td>(0.434)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>-0.308</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>-0.725</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 4 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
<td>(0.430)</td>
<td>(0.454)</td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian share in 2003</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>-0.482</td>
<td>-0.740</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 5 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.662)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.477)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 3</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 4</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.511***</td>
<td>0.500***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 5</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 3 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.478)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.551*</td>
<td>0.616*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 4 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.345)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan share in 2003</td>
<td>-0.912*</td>
<td>0.704*</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Cycle 5 × Competitive Election</td>
<td>(0.516)</td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.372)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 24,916
Adj. $R^2$: 0.12995

The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a given municipality has at least one councilor born in the origin country specified in the second row in a given year.

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Table 7: First Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>0.7581***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Post2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Romanian Share</td>
<td>-0.0385</td>
<td>-0.0385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0574)</td>
<td>(0.0574)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Romanian Share</td>
<td>0.5726***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Post2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>0.0068***</td>
<td>0.0075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0010)</td>
<td>(0.0011)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Municipality FE</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>115887</td>
<td>115897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic</td>
<td>42.70</td>
<td>47.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

The table above reports the first stage result for the 2SLS IV regression in equation (2). In column (1), we use Romanian share at the 2003 level for $Early_{mt}$, in column (2), we let $Early_{mt}$ equal to the current Romanian share in year $t$ up to 2007 and fix the share at the 2007 share from 2008 onward.
Table 8: IV Results: Likelihood of Electing Romanian-Born Councilor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) OLS</th>
<th>(2) OLS</th>
<th>(3) 2SLS</th>
<th>(4) 2SLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian share in 2003</td>
<td>0.271**</td>
<td>0.472*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Post2007</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Romanian Share</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Romanian Share</td>
<td>0.218**</td>
<td>0.518*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>× Post2007</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Romanian Inflow</td>
<td>0.152**</td>
<td>0.133*</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>(0.473)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>115,887</td>
<td>115,897</td>
<td>115,887</td>
<td>115,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep var mean</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

The table above presents a comparison of the OLS and 2SLS specifications of equation (2). The first two columns present the results from the OLS specification. Columns (3) and (4) are 2SLS results that correspond to columns (1) and (2) from the first stage specifications in Table 7.
Appendix
Figure 21: Roster of Candidates in a Municipal Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LISTA N. 1</th>
<th>LISTA N. 2</th>
<th>LISTA N. 3</th>
<th>LISTA N. 4</th>
<th>LISTA N. 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ROBERTO RIGHETTINI  
nato a Salò il 12.1.1966  
Candidato alla carica di Sindaco |
| DELIA MARIA CASTELLINI  
nata a Toscolano Maderno il 6.2.1964  
Candidato alla carica di Sindaco |
| PAOLO ELENA  
nato a Brescia il 21.5.1961  
Candidato alla carica di Sindaco |
| MARCO GIOVANNI MANFREDI  
nato a Rovereto (TN) il 6.4.1944  
Candidato alla carica di Sindaco |
| DAVIDE GAZZOLI  
nato a Brescia il 17.3.1968  
Candidato alla carica di Sindaco |

| MARCO BASILE  
nato a Bovezzo il 25.4.1962 |
| AGOSTINO BERTASIO detto AGO  
nato a Toscolano Maderno il 15.11.1957 |
| IDA BRESCIANI in Frazzini  
nata a Brescia il 13.10.1969 |
| ERNESTO BUFFOLI  
nato a Polaveno il 11.7.1956 |
| GIULIANA CAPPUCCINI  
nata a Salò il 3.3.1968 |
| MARIA CRISTINA KLEIN  
nata a Desenzano del Garda il 25.8.1984 |
| SIKIO CINIBENI  
nato a Gargnano il 28.6.1959 |
| VITO PASINI  
nato a Brescia il 1.1.1965 |
| MASSIMO STUCCHI  
nato a Merate (CO) il 10.2.1961 |
| TERESA MARIA TRANCHINA detta TERRY  
nata a Mazzarè del Vallo (TP) il 29.9.1959 |

| ANDREA ANDREOLI  
nato a Gavardo il 23.10.1968 |
| MARIA GRAZIA BOSCHETTI  
nata a Toscolano Maderno il 19.11.1956 |
| DAVIDE BONI  
nato a Gavardo il 20.1.1965 |
| VIRNA CIVIERI  
nata a Salò il 27.2.1973 |
| ALESSANDRO COMINOLI  
nato a Desenzano del Garda il 21.12.1978 |
| ELISA COZZAGLIO  
nato a Gavardo il 5.6.1986 |
| FABIO GAETARELLI  
nato a Salò il 4.5.1965 |
| ALICE SAGHERER  
nata a Gavardo il 10.11.1968 |
| MAURO RIGHETTI  
nato a Zurigo (Svizzera) il 25.12.1977 |
| PIETRO SCONCRO  
nato a Brescia il 16.10.1962 |

| FAUSTO USARDA  
nato a Brescia il 16.5.1967 |
| FRANCO SCHETTI  
nato a Lugano di Vicenza il 7.8.1934 |
| GIUSEPPE CAMPANARI  
nato a Desenzano del Garda il 16.8.1953 |
| FEDERICA SERESINA  
nata a Brescia il 19.3.1862 |
| STEFANO COMINOLI  
nato a Salò il 26.4.1949 |
| MARCO SIMONI  
nato a Desenzano del Garda il 23.6.1984 |
| MICHELA BERTASIO  
nata a Desenzano del Garda il 4.9.1990 |
| PAOLA GOTTARDO  
nato a Brescia il 16.7.1972 |
| GIUSEPPE SECCAMANI  
nato a Bovolone il 21.11.1946 |
| EMILIA PASINI  
nata a Brescia il 25.2.1966 |
| SILVANO BENDONELLI  
nato a Gavardo il 22.1.1959 |
| FABIO BRESCIANI  
nato a Gavardo il 31.1.1954 |

| RAMON NICOLETI HUSEMAS  
nato a Oradea (Rumenoia) il 1.5.1979 |
| CINZIA TALEON  
nata a Brescia il 21.11.1974 |
| GIOVANNA CALDA  
nato a Desenzano del Garda il 16.12.1996 |
| PIER LUIGI PASINI  
nato a Desenzano del Garda il 23.2.1946 |
| MARCO MAZZELLA  
nato a Verona il 7.5.1982 |
| ALESSANDRO FORESTI  
nato a Desenzano del Garda il 4.11.1956 |

Place of birth mentioned below the name of the candidate

Toscolano Maderno, 18 maggio 2013

IL SINDACO

Roberto Righettini